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1. Introduction 
 
This study presents evidence that capital investment choices are influenced by voluntary 
adoptions of clawback provisions that authorize boards of directors to recoup executive 
compensation based on financial results that are later restated. Restitutive clawbacks were 
sanctioned by Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 304 (SOX 304, U.S. House of Representatives, 2002) 
in response to allegations in the early 2000s that executive compensation was boosted by 
financial misreporting. Despite lax enforcement by the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), U.S. listed firms voluntarily adopting clawback clauses rose from 19 in 
2005 to 1,032 in 2012. Similar allegations arising during the 2008-2009 financial crisis 
motivated Dodd-Frank Act Section 954 (U.S. House of Representatives, 2010) to bar U.S. 
exchange listings by companies lacking clawback policies. A pending SEC rule to implement 
DFA 954
1
 observes that “while these incentives could result in high-quality financial reporting 
that would benefit investors, they may also alter operating decisions of executive officers.” It 
also requests “comment on any effect the proposed requirements may have on efficiency, 
competition and capital formation (SEC 2015, 103-104).” 
Consistent with their purported benefits, prior research finds clawbacks to enhance 
financial reporting quality as evidenced by fewer restatements, larger earnings response 
coefficients, fewer reported internal control weaknesses, lower audit fees, quicker audit 
reporting, lower borrowing costs, reduced loan collateral, longer loan terms, positive stock price 
reactions, and higher sensitivity of chief executive officer (CEO) annual pay to reported earnings 
                                                 
1 Proposed SEC Rule 10D-1 authorizes recovery of excess incentive-based pay received by executive officers 
without regard to fault in the three fiscal years preceding the date a listed company is required to prepare an 
accounting restatement, where per Section 16 of the Exchange Act, executive officers include the company’s 
president, principal financial officer, principal accounting officer, any vice-president in charge of a principal 
business unit, division or function, and any other person who performs policymaking functions for the company 
(Ackerman 2015; SEC 2015). It is estimated that Rule 10D-1 would apply to 4,845 registrants (SEC 2015, 108). 
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(Babenko, Bennette, Bizak, and Coles 2015; Chan, Chen, Chen, and Yu 2012; Chan, Chen, and 
Chen 2013; Chen, Green, and Owers 2014; Dehaan, Hodge, and Shevlin 2013; Iskandar-Datta 
and Jia 2013).2 Related findings indicate that enhanced financial reporting quality increases 
capital investment efficiency, suggesting a substantive potential clawback benefit (e.g., Biddle 
and Hilary 2006; Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi 2009; McNichols and Stubben 2008), yet no direct 
evidence exists. Pertinently, Chan, Chen, Chen, and Yu (2015) report that clawback adoptions 
induce managers to engage in real transactions manipulation (e.g., cutting research and 
development expenses) to preserve expected compensation. 3  Because R&D expenses are 
synonymous with R&D investments (hereafter R&D), these findings raise questions of how 
clawbacks affect capital investment mix choices and how they affect capital investment 
efficiency. 
Prior analytical research suggests possible relations among clawback adoptions, 
performance-based compensation, earnings management, and capital investment choices. 
Benmelech, Kandel, and Veronesi (2010) show for a setting in which executives possess private 
information regarding investment opportunities, boards and market participants rely on earnings 
to evaluate them, and executives receive stock-based compensation (including annual equity 
grants, changes in the value of equity holdings, stock-price-linked dismissal), there arise 
incentives to manage earnings. In particular, executives of firms with high growth opportunities 
have incentives to exploit growth options and if growth slows , to manage earnings and even 
forego R&D projects to maintain a pretence of high earnings growth. Kedia and Philippon 
(2009) show that executives with stock-based compensation not only manage earnings but also 
                                                 
2
 Similar to Dehann et al. (2013), we refer to financial reporting quality as the degree of diligent and unbiased 
application of financial reporting standards.  
3
 In a similar vein, Kyung, Lee, and Marquardt (2016) report that clawback adopters increase non-GAAP earnings 
management following clawback adoptions. 
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hire and invest to mask a decline in investment opportunities. By mitigating incentives to boost 
pay using overstated earnings that might later be restated (Chen et al. 2014; Benmelech et al. 
2010), clawback provision adoptions provide executives with incentives to rely more on other 
means to preserve expected compensation (Ewert and Wagenhofer 2005; Chan et al. 2015). 
Recent evidence by Chan et al. (2015) that firms adopting clawback provisions reduce R&D 
expenses and thus expenditures, while consistent with incentives to preserve earning-linked 
compensation, begs whether executives thereby lower total capital investment and longer-term 
value, or rather shift capital investment mix so as to better preserve longer-run profitability and 
firm value. 
By this reasoning, we posit that managers respond to clawback provision adoptions by 
shifting their capital investment mix away from R&D as previously found, and toward property, 
plant, and equipment (hereafter capex) and also acquisitions conditional on enabling liquidity, 
with the effects of clawback adoptions on total capital investment an open empirical question. 
Our reasoning reflects that R&D investments reduce earnings immediately with generally 
delayed and less certain paybacks (Bhagat and Welch 1995; Kothari, Laguerre, and Leone 2002; 
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 2006). By comparison, capex expenditures generate formulaic 
amortization and depreciation charges and nearer-term profits from generally extant business 
contexts. While acquisition investments can immediately enhance and may never reduce 
earnings, they also require enabling liquidity, integration with existing operations, and can often 
require lead-times to execute. The increased proportion of performance-based pay associated 
with clawback adoptions documented in prior studies is consistent with both enhanced precision 
in earnings measurement and earnings and risk offsets for managers and provides added 
incentive to shift investment mix. 
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We test these propositions using a propensity-matched sample of 4,200 firm-years for 463 
voluntary clawback adoptions between 2005 and 2012 inclusive.4 Our findings are consistent 
with clawback adoptions inducing capital investment mix shifts from R&D to capex 
expenditures, and to acquisition expenditures for firms with enabling liquidity. Increased capital 
expenditures by clawback adopters are positively associated with the likelihood of 
overinvestment in property, plant, and equipment beyond a level supported by investment 
opportunities, consistent with an induced investment shift. Corroborative sub-sample tests 
confirm significant reductions in R&D investments and significant increases in capital 
expenditures for firms with higher proportions of performance-based pay, and for firms with 
higher market-perceived growth opportunities, thus lending support to the effects of clawback 
adoptions operating via compensation incentives. A sub-sample test also confirms that clawback 
adoptions are positively associated with the likelihood of overinvestment in property, plant, and 
equipment and in total capital assets for firms with higher proportions of performance-based pay. 
The shift in capital investment mix and capital overinvestment remain identical after controlling 
for the risk-toleration incentives related to executive equity portfolio, indicating that the ex post 
settling up mechanism introduced by clawback adoptions has a significant incremental effect on 
capital investment mix. 
Our findings contribute to prior research in several ways. First, we extend prior evidence 
regarding the effects of clawback adoptions to reveal that the R&D reductions documented in 
Chan et al. (2015) comprise part of a broader capital investment mix shift away from R&D and 
toward capex and acquisitions investments conditional on enabling liquidity. Second, we show 
                                                 
4
 The period 2005-2012 provides a sample of voluntary clawback adoptions implemented subsequent to SOX 304 
and prior to Dodd-Frank Act provisions that progressively intimated mandatory clawbacks, including Sections 951 
(executive compensation adopted on January 25, 2011), 952 (compensation consultants adopted on June 20, 2012), 
953 (executive-employee pay ratios adopted on September 18, 2013 and pay-for-performance adopted on April 29, 
2015), and 955 (hedging adopted on February 9, 2015), with 954 (clawbacks) pending. 
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that this shift in capital investment mix results in overinvestment in capital assets. Combined, 
these findings suggest an unintended consequence of clawback provisions that can help inform a 
pending proposal for clawback provisions to be a listing pre-condition for U.S. exchanges. Third, 
our findings contribute insights regarding the relation between financial reporting quality and 
capital investment efficiency. Whereas prior studies document that higher financial reporting 
quality can enhance capital investment efficiency by mitigating capital underinvestment 
associated with financial constraints and capital over-investment associated with free cash flows 
by enhancing transparency (e.g., Biddle and Hilary 2006; McNichols and Stubben 2008; Hope 
and Thomas 2008; Biddle et al. 2009; Chen, Hope, Li, and Wang 2011; Cheng, Dhaliwal, and 
Zhang 2013; Chen, Young, and Zhuang 2013; Lo 2015; Biddle, Callahan, Hong, Knowles 2016),  
our findings indicate that countervailing actions taken by executives to clawback adoptions can 
decrease, rather than increase, capital investment efficiency even when financial reporting 
quality is enhanced by clawback provision adoptions. Finally, the increased likelihood of capital 
overinvestment associated with clawback adoptions differs from the well-documented empire-
building proclivity in the sense that the former stems from a shift in capital investment mix that 
attempts to preserve incentive-based compensation whereas the latter is motivated by executives’ 
direct preference for a larger salary associated with firm size irrespective of incentive alignment 
(Jensen 1986). 
In Section 2 we present motivations and hypotheses. Section 3 details research design. 
Section 4 describes empirical results, and Section 5 summarizes and discusses our findings 
2. Motivating Evidence and Hypotheses 
2.1 Prior research evidence regarding clawback provisions 
Incomplete information regarding executive activities and investment opportunities 
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motivate earnings-linked executive compensation contracts that in turn provide executives with 
opportunities to manage earnings to influence their compensation (e.g., Jensen and Murphy 1990; 
Healy 1985; Cheng and Warfield 2005). Allegations that executives managed accounting 
accruals to inflate their compensation arising amid prominent firm failures in the early 2000s 
(e.g., Enron, Worldcom, Global Crossing), led the U.S. Congress to sanctions restitutive 
clawbacks of executive compensation based on subsequently restated earnings in Sarbanes-
Oxley Act Section 304 (SOX 304, U.S. House of Representatives, 2002). Similar allegations of 
financial misreporting to raise executive pay during the 2008-2009 financial crisis motivated 
Dodd-Frank Act Section 954, (DFA 954, U.S. House of Representatives, 2010), which bars U.S. 
exchange listings by companies lacking clawback policies. Advocates of clawback provisions 
(see for example Chan et al. 2012, 2013 and Iskandar-Datta and Jia 2013) contend that clawback 
provisions will impose an incremental penalty on earnings restatements and thus enhance 
financial reporting quality. Despite subsequent confirming evidence profiled below, pending 
SEC Rule 10D-1 to implement DFA 954
5
 admits that “they may also alter operating decisions of 
executive officers” and requests “comment on any effect the proposed requirements may have on 
efficiency, competition and capital formation (SEC 2015, 103-104).” This study provides 
evidence regarding this question. 
Prior research documents that clawback adoptions enhance financial reporting quality 
across a range of research paradigms. Chan et al. (2012) and Dehaan et al. (2013) find that 
                                                 
5 Proposed SEC Rule 10D-1 authorizes recovery of excess incentive-based pay received by executive officers 
without regard to fault in the three fiscal years preceding the date a listed company is required to prepare an 
accounting restatement, where per Section 16 of the Exchange Act, executive officers include the company’s 
president, principal financial officer, principal accounting officer, any vice-president in charge of a principal 
business unit, division or function, and any other person who performs policymaking functions for the company 
(Ackerman 2015; SEC 2015). It is estimated that Rule 10D-1 would apply to 4,845 registrants (SEC 2015, 108). 
Beyond the “Recovery of Erroneously Awarded Compensation” indicated in its title, the SEC anticipates that Rule 
10D-1 will provide higher quality financial reporting by discouraging misreporting and “increased incentive to take 
steps to reduce the likelihood of inadvertent misreporting”, for example by “devoting more resources to the 
production of high-quality financial reporting” (SEC 2015, 115). 
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clawback adoptions reduce earnings restatements and auditors’ reports of material internal 
control weaknesses, as well as reducing audit fees and hours. Dehaan et al. (2013) find clawback 
adoptions to decrease the frequency with which reported earnings meet or just beat consensus 
analysts’ earnings forecasts. Babenko et al. (2015), Dehaan et al. (2013), Iskandar-Datta and Jia 
(2013), Chan et al. (2013), and Chen et al. (2014) find that investors respond favorably to 
voluntary clawback provisions, interpreting them as a pre-commitment to high-quality financial 
reporting. Dehaan et al. (2013), Chen et al. (2014), and Babenko et al. (2015) document an 
increase in the sensitivity of CEO annual pay to report earnings for clawback adopters, reflecting 
that boards perceive post-adoption earnings as more revealing regarding performance and 
executive efforts, consistent with the agency models in Goldman and Slezak (2006) and Laux 
and Laux (2009). 
Higher quality financial reporting also reduces information asymmetry regarding the future 
payoffs and risks of investment projects (e.g., Healy and Palepu 2001; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000) 
thus helping to mitigate capital over- and under-investment (e.g., Biddle and Hilary 2006; 
McNichols and Stubben 2008; Hope and Thomas 2008; Biddle et al 2009; Chen et al. 2011; 
Cheng et al. 2013; Chen et al/ 2013; Lo 2015; Biddle et al. 2016). If clawback provisions enhance 
financial reporting quality, they should by these findings enhance capital investment efficiency 
unless offset by countervailing executive actions to preserve performance-linked compensation. 
Other studies question whether clawback provisions enhance financial reporting quality. 
Denis (2012) argues that the reduction in earnings restatements reported by Chan et al. (2012) 
may reflect managers’ attempt to avoid clawbacks, and that the reduction in audit efforts may 
reflect auditors’ overconfidence of the positive anticipated effect of clawback provisions on 
financial reporting quality. Pyzoha (2015) experimentally finds that executives with a higher 
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portion of incentive-based pay are less (more) likely to accept a lower (higher) quality auditor’s 
proposed restatement. Fried and Shilon (2012), Babenko et al. (2015), and Erkens, Gan, and 
Yurtoglu (2014) find that clawback provisions are rarely enforced even when earnings 
restatements occur. Kyung et al. (2016) find that clawback adopters disclose lower-quality non-
GAAP earnings more frequently than non-adopters do. Taken altogether, we interpret these 
findings as providing qualified support for clawback adoptions enhancing financial reporting 
quality. 
Of particular interest are recent findings regarding the effects of clawback adoptions on 
R&D expenditures and pay-performance sensitivity. Chan et al. (2015) find that managers 
respond to clawback adoptions by cutting discretionary expenses such as R&D and advertising 
expenses to boost earnings and stock price performance, where this effect is stronger for firms 
with high investor-perceived growth potential and transient institutional ownership that provides 
managers with stronger incentives to achieve short-term earnings targets. As observed by Chan 
et al. (2015), this “real” versus accrual-based means of managing earnings less likely to be 
deemed improper by regulators and auditors (Ewert and Wagenhofer 2005; Graham, Harvey, and 
Rajgopal 2005; Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen, Dey, and Lys 2008). Because a reduction of R&D 
expense is simultaneously a reduction of R&D capital investment, this raises the question of how 
clawback adoptions relate more broadly to total capital investment, capital investment mix, and 
to capital investment efficiency. 
Proposed Rule 10-1 (SEC 2015) specifically notes “an increased likelihood of an executive 
making inefficient operating decisions in order to affect specific financial reporting measures as 
a result of the decreased incentive to use accounting judgments to affect those financial reporting 
measures,” with avoiding complicated projects and deferred R&D investment as examples (SEC 
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2015, 119, citing Babenko et al. (2015) and Chan et al. (2015)).  In particular, the SEC observes 
that, “while the increased incentive to produce high-quality financial reporting and thus reduce 
the likelihood of material accounting errors should increase the informational efficiency of 
investment opportunities, it may also encourage executives to forgo value-enhancing projects if 
doing so would decrease the likelihood of a financial restatement” (SEC 2015, 118). These 
possible effects on capital investment decisions and capital investment efficiency are the focus of 
this study. 
2.2 Hypotheses 
Several theoretical studies regarding the interplays between performance-based 
compensation, earnings manipulation, and investment decision provide insight on the effects of 
clawbacks on earnings manipulation and investment decisions. Benmelech et al. (2010) analyses 
an agency model in which executives privately observe investment opportunities and provide 
financial reports to shareholders and boards of directors, while boards rely on reported earnings 
to evaluate the investment opportunities and provide executives with stock-based compensation.  
In this model, stock-based compensation not only induces executives to exert their efforts to 
develop and discover investment opportunities but also encourages earnings management to 
maintain the pretence of a high growth profile and avoid a stock price crash.
6
 In particular, 
executives may conceal a decline in growth opportunities and even forgo some profitable R&D 
                                                 
6
 In a similar vein, Kedia and Philippone (2009) show that managers with private information on low productivity 
may manipulate earnings and overinvest at the same time to disguise the low true productivity and boost stock prices 
for their stock sale and option exercise. They model investing as a signalling device and earnings management 
enables investment despite low productivity. Laux (2014) presents a model in which boards provides executives 
with equity incentives and use reported earnings to decide whether to continue investment projects. In his model, a 
higher convexity in executive compensation enables managers to receive rewards only for good outcome (i.e., 
higher protection for downside risk), enhancing value-increasing efforts as well as earnings management and 
overinvestment.   
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investment opportunities in order to show reported earnings consistent with a high growth rate.
7
 
Furthermore, Benmelech et al. (2010, 1799) argue that clawback clauses that enable boards to 
recoup excess annual pay contingent on later restatement cannot eliminate executive incentives 
to manage earnings to preserve stock-based wealth and keep their jobs.
8
 This follows from 
incentives from changes in stock-based wealth and performance-based dismissal being generally 
larger than incentives from changes in annual pay (Jensen and Murphy 1990; Core, Guay, and 
Larcker 2003).  To preserve their incentive-based compensation through earnings management, 
executives generally prefer accrual manipulation to real transactions manipulation because the 
former is less costly than the latter.  However, clawback provisions increase the cost of accrual 
manipulation and therefore increases the choice of real transactions manipulation (Ewert and 
Wagenhofer 2005; Chan et al. 2015). 
Our first hypothesis tests this insight by considering how clawback adoptions influence 
total capital investment and its mix of R&D, capital expenditure, and acquisition components. 
Because they are immediately expensed, R&D investments reduce earnings immediately with 
generally delayed and less certain profitability paybacks (Bhagat and Welch 1995; Kothari et al. 
2002; Coles et al. 2006). Capital expenditures by comparison reduce earnings via formulaic 
amortization and depreciation charges that depend on utilization, and generate nearer-term 
profits from generally extant business contexts. While acquisition investments can immediately 
enhance and may never reduce earnings depending on the profitability of firms whose control is 
obtained, they require enabling liquidity, integration with existing operations, and can require 
                                                 
7
 They originally show that executives forego some investment projects in order to use saved cash to maintain a high 
growth rate of dividend and argue that their results are consistent with cutting R&D expenses as part of real 
transactions manipulation documented by Graham et al. (2005). However, the reduction in R&D envisaged by 
Benmelech et al. does not represent substitution between accrual manipulation and real transactions manipulation as 
a response to an increase in the cost of financial misreporting. 
8 Fried and Shilon (2012) point out that no clawback of excess stock-sale proceeds is a limitation of Dodd-Frank 
clawback requirements.   
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lead-times to execute.
9
 Thus, when considered by their ability to substitute for accruals 
management constrained by clawback adoptions, capital expenditures and acquisitions hold 
potential to enhance income sooner than R&D, with lead times more idiosyncratic for 
acquisitions; capital expenditures and acquisitions hold potential to enhance income with less 
uncertainty than R&D, with acquisitions again more idiosyncratic; and capital expenditures and 
R&D are generally more scalable, with acquisitions requiring enabling liquidity. Thus, beyond 
total capital investment, clawback adoptions may induce executives to change their mix of capital 
investments to influence performance-linked compensation. If clawback adoption leads to higher 
annual pay-earnings sensitivity as found by prior research, this will further amplify incentives for 
“real” earnings management that can include capital investments.10  
Following from this reasoning, we propose hypothesis H1 in alternate form: 
Hypothesis H1: Clawback provisions motivate capital investment mix shifts from R&D to 
capital expenditure and to acquisitions for firms with ample enabling liquidity. 
When testing H1, we control for a range of determinants of capital investment identified in 
prior research (Biddle et al. 2009), including institutional investment, analysts, G-score, accrual 
quality, sales growth, asset size, market-to-book ratio, the standard deviations of cash flows, 
sales and investments, Z-score, tangibility, capital structure, financial slack, cash flows to sales, 
dividends, losses, firm age, and firm- and year-fixed effects (see Section 3 below for additional 
details). 
Our second hypothesis tests whether the relations predicted by hypothesis H1 operate via 
performance-based executive compensation incentives. Specifically, H2 predicts that the 
                                                 
9
 Profits net of depreciation and amortization on write-ups to fair values of acquired depreciable assets under the 
purchase method of accounting for business combinations. 
10
 Despite the risk of potential future clawback, the increase in pay-performance sensitivity may lead to an increase 
in accrual manipulation to some extent that such increase would not trigger future earnings restatements. Beyond 
that level, managers may increase the costly real activity manipulation.  
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relations predicted by H1 will hold more strongly for a subset of clawback firms partitioned by a 
high proportion of performance-linked compensation, in alternate form as: 
Hypothesis H2: Clawback provisions motivate capital investment mix shifts from R&D 
expenditures to capital expenditures and to acquisitions for firms with ample enabling 
liquidity, for firms providing their CEOs with higher performance-based incentives. 
Results consistent with hypothesis H2 provide assurance that the capital investment effects of 
clawback adoptions reflect performance-linked executive compensation incentives. We test 
hypothesis H2 using the same set of controls for capital investment as described above for 
hypothesis H1.  
3. Research Design 
3.1 Sample selection 
Following Chan et al. (2012), we use the GMI Ratings database to identify firms that 
voluntarily adopt clawback provisions, and exclude financial firms because many are subject to 
clawbacks mandated by the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Accounting data are 
obtained from Compustat, stock price data from CRSP, corporate governance data from Risk 
Metrics and GMI Ratings, analyst coverage data from I/B/E/S, and institutional ownership data 
from Thompson Financial. We examine clawback adoptions during fiscal years 2005 through 
2012 inclusive, which comprise more “voluntary” clawback adoptions amid progressive 
adoptions of DFA 954 provisions. 
To control for differences in firm characteristics that may influence clawback adoptions and 
capital investment decisions, we follow Chan et al. (2013) to create a propensity-matched sample 
of firms that have not adopted clawback provisions but with a similar probability of adopting as a 
matched adopting counterpart. We do so by regressing an indicator variable for clawback 
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adopters (Clawbackt) on ex-ante economic determinants of clawback adoptions identified in 
prior studies (Xt-1): 
  Clawbackt  =  α0  + ∑ αi Xt-1 + ɛt , (1) 
where Clawbackt equals one if a firm adopts a clawback provision and zero otherwise. As in 
Chan et al. (2013), Xt-1 includes firm size, accounting profitability, the number of segments, prior 
restatements, a corporate governance index, board independence, audit committee size, the 
number of board meetings, institutional ownership, insider ownership, and CEO tenure in year t–
1. Firm size and the number of segments reflect operational complexity effects on the ability of 
external stakeholders to monitor managerial behavior. The corporate governance and ownership 
variables reflect the intensity of monitoring and influence over managerial behavior. Prior 
restatements reflect incentives to restore credibility to financial reporting and CEO tenure 
reflects CEO influence within a firm. 
Estimating Equation (1) by logistic regression for each fiscal year yields a propensity score 
for each firm-year in the predicted value of Clawback. We then match each clawback adoption 
firm-year with the non-adopting firm with the closest score in that year and within a distance of 
0.01 from the adopting firm’s propensity score. The pre- and post-adoption period for each firm 
spans T-3 to T+3 where T is the adoption year for a clawback adopter and its propensity-score-
matched counterpart. We use this time horizon to allow a sufficient length of time for managers 
to adjust the magnitude and mix of capital investments in response to clawback adoptions.11 To 
mitigate the influence of extreme outliers, we winsorize all continuous variables at the 1% and 
99% levels. 
                                                 
11
 This time horizon is chosen to be sufficiently long to reveal how capital investments respond to clawback 
adoptions but not so long as to be confounded by other influences on capital investments. 
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3.2 Baseline relation between clawback adoptions and managerial incentives 
The boards of firms that adopt clawback clauses may change the other managerial incentive 
schemes. For example, boards may voluntarily adopt clawback clauses as part of a broader plan 
to tighten overall incentive-alignment in executive compensation or may increase a pay-weight 
on accounting profitability in anticipation of the enhanced reliability of earnings (Babenko et al. 
2015; Dehaan et al. 2013; Chen et al. 2014). On the other hand, as clawback adoption makes 
incentive pay more risky, boards may reduce the use of incentive-based compensation (Denis 
2012) or pay risk premium (Dehaan et al. 2013; Chen et al. 2014) in order to keep risk averse, 
competent managers. We thus allow that concurrent changes in executive compensation 
contracts can influence the firms’ investment decisions. 
We begin by exploring baseline relation between clawback adoptions and managerial 
incentives. First, we estimate changes in the sensitivities of executive annual pay flow to 
accounting-and market-based performance. To estimate the pay-performance sensitivity, we run 
the following regression model: 
            TotalPayt = β1 Postt + β2 Clawbackt × Postt  + β3 ROAt + β4 Clawbackt  × ROAt  (2) 
                   + β5 Postt × ROAt + β6 Clawbackt × Postt× ROAt + ∑ βi Controlst 
                  + ∑ βi Controlst× Clawbackt + ∑ βi Controlst+1× Postt  
                  + ∑ βi Controlst × Clawbackt × Postt + Fixed Effects + ɛt. 
In Equation (2), TotalPayt is the logarithm of one plus CEO annual total pay for year t
 12, and we 
adjust the annual total pay (ExecuComp TDC1) for inflation using the U.S. Consumer Price 
Index. ROAt is accounting return on assets for year t, and RETt, is 12-month stock returns. 
Coefficient β3 indicates the base sensitivity of CEO annual total pay to ROA. Coefficient β6 for 
interaction term Clawback × Post × ROA indicates the incremental change in pay-earnings 
                                                 
12
 Base salary is determined at the employment contract date and rarely adjusted based on performance. In contrast, 
the amount of bonus, stock and option grants for year t is largely based on the CEO’s performance for year t and 
approved after the end of year t.  
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sensitivity subsequent to clawback adoptions. We also estimate the same regression for equity 
grants (i.e., stock and option grants) and cash pay (i.e., salary and bonus). Control variables 
follow Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) and include firm performance volatility measured 
by the standard deviations of ROA and RET estimated over the prior five years (VOLROAt and 
VOLRETt); growth opportunities measured using average market-to-book equity ratio estimated 
over the prior five years (MTBt); and demand for incremental efforts and ability required to 
manage a firm with a larger firm size measured by the logarithm of sales during year t 
(LOGSALEt).
13 We further include firm- and year-fixed effects in Equation (2) to control for 
cross-sectional variation in CEO annual pay associated with omitted time-invariant firm 
characteristics and inter-temporal changes in CEO annual pay associated macroeconomic effects, 
respectively. 
Second, we estimate changes in the composition of CEO annual total pay (e.g., 
percentage of performance-based pay in total pay) and the risk-tolerating incentive associated 
with CEO firm-specific equity portfolio. In particular, we estimate the following regression 
Equation (3): 
IncentiveVart  = β1 Postt + β2 Clawbackt × Postt  + ∑ βi Controlst  + Fixed Effects + ɛt  (3) 
where IncentiveVart refers to the compensation incentive variables: (a) SalaryRatiot, defined as 
the percentage of salary in total annual pay for year t, (b) StockGrantRatiot, defined as the 
percentage of stock grants in total annual pay for year t, (c) OptionGrantRatiot, defined as the 
percentage of option grants to total annual pay for year t, and (d) RiskTolerancet, defined as risk-
tolerating incentive related to CEO equity portfolio for year t and measured as Vegat × 100 / 
                                                 
13
 Following Harford and Li (2007), we augment Equation (2) by employing sales growth as another performance 
measure and decomposing stock returns into positive and negative ones. The impact of clawback adoption on the 
annual pay-ROA sensitivity remains identical with R-squares significantly reduced. We also re-estimated Equation 
(2) for a subsample of non-turnover observations and obtain qualitatively identical results. 
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(Vegat + Deltat). Following Core and Guay (2002) and Coles et al. (2006), we measure Delta as a 
dollar change in CEO equity portfolio by one percentage point and Vega as a dollar change in 
CEO equity portfolio by 0.01 change in the standard deviation of stock returns, respectively. If 
CEOs are risk averse and cannot diversify away their firm-specific wealth, a higher (lower) level 
of Vega relative to Delta will encourage them to undertake more (less) risky investment projects. 
Coles et al. (2006) find that Vega is negatively related to capital expenditure (producing less 
uncertain financial outcome) and positively to R&D expenditures (producing more uncertain 
financial outcome) after controlling for Delta, suggesting that Vega increases managers’ risk 
taking. We further allow for a tradeoff between pay convexity, earnings management, and 
investment efficiency considered by Laux (2014). In his model, the shift to a more convex pay 
(e.g., more option grants and less stock grants) is positively associated with value-enhancing 
efforts but negatively with financial reporting quality and investment efficiency. Controls and 
Fixed effects in Equation (3) are the same as those in Equation (2) and are not interacted with 
indicator variables Post, Clawback, and Clawback × Post. 
3.3 Relation between clawback adoptions and shift in capital investment mix 
Hypothesis H1 predicts that clawback adopters will shift capital investment mix from R&D 
to capex following clawback adoptions. To test this hypothesis, we estimate the relations 
between clawback adoptions and capital investment by type using Equation (4):  
InvVart+1 = γ1 Postt + γ2 Clawbackt ×Postt + ∑ γi Controlt + Fixed Effects + ɛt , (4) 
where InvVart+1  refers to the investment policy variables: (a) Investmentt+1, defined as total 
capital investment (measured as the sum of capital expenditures, acquisitions, and R&D 
expenditures less sales of property, plant and equipment) for year t+1 multiplied by 100 and 
scaled by total assets at the end of year t; (b) Acquisitiont+1, defined as acquisitions for year t+1 
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multiplied by 100 deflated by total assets at the end of year t; (c) Capext+1, defined as capital 
expenditures for year t+1 multiplied by 100 deflated by total assets at the end of year t; and (d) 
R&Dt+1, defined as research and development expenditures for year t+1 multiplied by 100 
deflated by total assets at the end of year t.14 
Following prior studies (e.g., Biddle and Hillary 2006; Biddle et al. 2009), we control for 
year t firm characteristics associated with capital investment and financial constraints using: (a) 
proxies for investment opportunities measured by sales growth (SalesGrowth) and Tobin’s Q 
(Mkt-to-Book); (b) indicators of financial constraints measured by operating cash flows 
(CFOsale), financial slack (Slack), firm- and industry-average capital structure (K-structure and 
Ind-K-structure, respectively), and dividend payout ratio (Dividend); (c) bankruptcy risk and cost 
measured by the standard deviation of operating cash flows (Std-cfo), the standard deviation of 
sales (Std-sales), Z-score (Z-score), tangibility (Tangibility), and an indicator for operating losses 
(Losses); (d) the intensity of internal and external monitoring proxied by the corporate 
governance index (g-index), an indicator for missing g-index values (G-Dummy), institutional 
ownership (Institutions), and analyst coverage (Analysts); and (e) other related firm 
characteristics measured by firm size (LogAsset), firm age (Age), operating cycle 
(OperatingCycle), accrual quality (AQ), and the standard deviation of total investment (Std-
Investment).15 We further control for firm- and year-fixed effects in Equation (4). 
In Equation (4), coefficient β1 on Post reflects the average difference in unexpected capital 
                                                 
14 Not all R&D expenditures are expensed, but US accounting principles (ASC 730) permit only limited exceptions; 
IFRS guidance (IAS 38) requires R&D capitalization under limited conditions, but foreign firms listed in the US, for 
which IFRS is a reporting option, constitute only 1.9% of our sample firm-years. In either case this would bias 
against our findings and the untabulated result of a sensitivity test confirms that our results remain qualitatively 
identical with foreign US listers excluded. 
15
 Some of these control variables are used in prior studies to measure risk-taking. For example, firm size, the 
market-to-book ratio, capital structure, the standard deviations of cash flows and sale, an indicator variable for losses, 
and/or z-score are used by Coles et al. (2006) and Bargeron, Lehn and Zutter (2010). See Appendix Table A1 for a 
complete list of variable definitions and measures. 
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investment of non-adopters between the pre- and post-adoption periods. Coefficient β2 on 
Clawback×Post indicates the incremental effect of clawback adoption on unexpected capital 
investment, which H1 predicts to be positive and significant for capital expenditures (Capext+1) 
and negative and significant for R&D expenditures (R&Dt+1). 
Hypothesis H2 predicts that these relations will be enhanced for clawback adopters with 
higher performance-based pay. To test this hypothesis, we estimate Equation (4) for two 
subgroups partitioned by the percentage of performance-based pay in total pay. We classify as 
HighPerfPay (LowPerfPay) firms if their mean ratio of non-salary pay to total pay during three 
years immediately following the clawback adoption year is higher (lower) than the sample 
median.
16
  Since concurrent changes in the convexity in CEO firm-specific equity portfolio have 
no theoretical causal relations to clawback adoptions, we include the variable RiskTolerance in 
the subsample regression to control for potential changes in capital investment mix induced by 
changes in the convexity in CEO equity portfolio value.  
3.4 Relation between clawback adoptions and capital investment efficiency 
If the shift in capital investment following clawback adoptions estimated by Equation (4) 
occurs for earnings management, such a shift is likely to constitute inefficient investment that 
deviates from a level justified by investment opportunities. Thus, we examine whether the shift 
in capital investment mix following clawback adoptions is related to capital investment 
efficiency in two steps. First, we estimate deviations from expected capital investment by 
estimating the following regression for all Compustat non-financial firms with available data for 
our entire sample period:  
         InvVart+1 = γ0 + γ1 × SalesGrowtht + γ2 × Mkt-to-Bookt + Fixed Effects + ɛt                             (5) 
                                                 
16
 When the partition is based on whether the mean ratio of non-salary pay to total pay during three years 
immediately before the clawback adoption year exceeds the sample median, the results remain qualitatively identical.  
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where InvVart+1 refers to the investment policy variables for year t+1, SalesGrowtht and Mkt-to-
Bookt are proxies for firm-level investment opportunities for year t, and Fixed effects represent 
the variations in capital investment associated with time-invariant industry-specific factors and 
time-varying macroeconomic factors. We then estimate the residual of each regression and 
generate its quartiles. We define an indicator variable for overinvestment (i.e., Overinvestingt+1) 
equals to one if the residual is in the upper 25 percentile and zero if the residual is between the 
25 and 75 percentiles. Similarly, we define an indicator variable for underinvestment (i.e., 
Underinvestingt+1) that equals one if the residual is in the lower 25 percentile and zero if the 
residual is between the 25 and 75 percentiles. The underlying assumption in measuring 
overinvesting (underinvesting) in this manner is that the significantly high (low) level of 
unexpected investment beyond (below) that explained by firm-level investment opportunities and 
industry- and year-specific factors can be regarded as overinvesting (underinvesting).  
Next, we assess the effects of clawback adoptions on capital investment efficiency by 
estimating the following logistic regression:  
Overinvestingt+1 (Underinvestingt+1) = δ0 + δ1 × Clawbackt + δ2 × Postt + δ3 × Clawbackt × Postt  
                                                             + ∑ δi × Controlst + Fixed Effects + ɛt  (6) 
 
Equation (6) is estimated using the same control variables as for Equation (4), and controls for 
industry-fixed effects (based on SIC two-digit codes) and year-fixed effects. The coefficient on 
Post, δ2, captures an average change in the propensity of non-adopters to overinvest (underinvest) 
following clawback adoptions. The coefficient on Clawback × Post, δ3, reflects an average 
incremental change in the propensity of clawback adopters to overinvest (underinvest) following 
clawback adoptions. Finally, in Section 4.5 below we describe a validating test for whether 
acquisition capital investments are enhanced by enabling liquidity of clawback adopters. 
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4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Sample distribution and descriptive statistics 
Table 1 describes sample clawback adopters obtained from the Corporate Library data set 
that exclude financial firms as described above. Panel A shows year of clawback adoption and 
cumulative adopters by year during the sample period of 2005 through 2012 inclusive. Panel B 
describes sample selection. Panel A reveals clawback adoptions to generally increase year-on-
year during the sample period, rising from 19 in 2005 to 209 in 2012, with 56% (588 / 1,032) of 
new clawback adopters (versus sample firm years that depend on data availability) between 2010 
and 2012 inclusive. In Panel B, propensity score matching is applied as described above to select 
966 control firms from among 3,566 non-financial firms that did not adopt clawback clauses 
between 2005 and 2012 inclusive, which after omitting observations beyond year T-3 to T+3 
(where year T is the clawback provision adoption year), yields a final sample of 4,200 firm-year 
observations comprised of 2,188 observations for 463 clawback adopters and 2,012 observations 
for 429 non-adopters. The final sample is used to test the effect of clawback provision on capital 
investment mix. A sub-sample of 3,111 firm-year observations (1,674 observations for 357 
clawback adopters and 1,437 observations for 312 non-adopters is used to examine concurrent 
changes in executive compensation.
17
 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for firm-years with available data in Table 1. Shown 
are means, standard deviations, medians, and p-values for mean and median differences between 
clawback adopters and non-adopters for each test and control variable for 3,111 firm-year 
observations for the CEO compensation regression variables (Panel A) and 4,200 firm-year 
observations for the investment regression variables (Panel B). Notably for the CEO 
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 The sub-sample is an intersection of the GMI ratings dataset and the Execucomp dataset, with some observations 
missing due to missing values for compensation and determinants. 
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compensation regression variables, statistically significant mean differences are observed for the 
market-to-book ratio averaged over the previous five years (MTB) and the risk-tolerance 
incentive related to CEO equity holdings (RiskTolerance), which are higher for non-adopters. 
Non-adopters also exhibit lower mean total investment, acquisitions, median R&D expenditures, 
mean and median frequency of ample liquidity (AmpleCash) than clawback adopters. 
4.2 Associations between clawback adoptions and managerial incentives 
We begin by documenting for our sample concurrent changes in executive compensation 
incentives that may influence clawback adoption responses. Table 3 documents average changes 
in managerial incentives associated with clawback adoptions. Panel A indicates that CEO annual 
total pay and CEO annual equity grants (but not CEO annual cash pay) become more sensitive to 
return on assets (but not to stock returns) following clawback adoptions, consistent with prior 
evidence in Babenko et al. (2015), Chen et al. (2014), and Dehaan et al. (2013).18 As seen in the 
statistical significance for the ROA coefficient and the RET coefficient in all three columns, 
average positive pay-performance sensitivity is indicated for non-adopters.
19
 In columns (1) and 
(2), the significant positive coefficient for Clawback × Post × ROA and insignificant coefficient 
for Clawback × Post × RET indicates that the CEO annual total pay and CEO equity grants of 
clawback adopters become more sensitive to return on assets but not to stock returns after 
clawback adoptions. These results are consistent with the argument in prior studies that boards 
perceive accounting-based performance to become more reliable as measures of CEO effort 
following clawback adoptions. Untabulated results indicate that the increase in the sensitivity of 
                                                 
18
 Among the results of prior studies, those of Chen et al. (2014) are closest to ours. They find an increase in the 
sensitivity of CEO total pay and CEO total incentive pay (bonus plus equity grants) to return on assets. Dehaan et al. 
(2013) report an increase in the sensitivity of change in cash pay to a positive change in return on assets but not to a 
negative change in return on assets. 
19
 In Column (1), the insignificant coefficients for Clawback × ROA and Clawback × RET indicate an insignificant 
difference in the CEO pay-performance sensitivity between clawback adopters and non-adopters in the pre-adoption 
period. 
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CEO annual total pay to ROA is significant, regardless of whether ROA increases or decreases 
from year t–1 to year t. This hightened pay-earnings sensitivity should amplify the incentive to 
manage earnings in order to preserve executive compensation following a clawback adoption. 
Prior research reports mixed evidence regarding whether boards pay risk premia to offset 
increased compensation risk due to clawback adoptions.
 20
 Consistent with the finding of Datta-
Iskandar and Jia (2013), Panel A of Table 3 shows insignificant coefficients on Post and 
Clawback × Post, indicating that the boards of clawback firms do not pay such risk premium to 
CEOs. Panel B of Table 3 reports estimated effects of clawback adoptions on the composition of 
CEO total pay and the sensitivity of CEO equity portfolio to stock price changes. The results 
indicate that both the percentage of option grants in total pay (OptiongrantRatio) and the risk-
tolerating incentive (RiskTolerance) decrease following clawback adoptions, suggesting that the 
boards of clawback firms decrease convexity in CEO compensation to reduce managers’ risk-
taking incentives.
21
 Consistent with the results in Panel B of Table 3, untabulated results indicate 
that Vega is negatively associated with clawback adoptions, after controlling Delta. In contrast, 
clawback adoptions do not significantly change the percentage of stock grants in total pay and 
the percentage of salary in total pay.
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Table 4 presents the results of estimating Equations 2 and 3 for sub-samples partitioned by 
relatively high and low performance-based pay (based on whether average ratio of non-salary 
pay to total pay during the three years immediately after the clawback-adoption year is higher 
                                                 
20
 Dehaan et al. (2013) and Chen et al. (2014) find positive risk premium paid to the CEOs of clawback adopters 
after controlling for the economic determinants for expected CEO pay. In contrast, Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2013) 
find no reliable evidence that indicates such risk premium. 
21
 The decrease in convexity in CEO firm-specific equity portfolio may be caused by the reduction in the weight of 
option grants in total pay, the exercise of option holdings, and other changes in variables in the Black-Sholes 
formula. 
22
 The risk-tolerating incentive represents how much more sensitive the value of CEO equity portfolio is to a change 
in stock return volatility than to a change in stock returns. If a CEO is risk averse and he or she owns a considerable 
amount of stocks and options, the relative sensitivity can capture the CEO’s risk-taking or risk-tolerating incentive 
in investment decisions. See Appendix for detailed definition. 
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than its sample median). These results indicate that the increase in pay-performance sensitivity 
(Panel A) and the reduction of the percentage of option grants in total pay and the risk-taking 
incentive related to CEO equity portfolio (Panel B) are found for clawback firms with relatively 
high performance-based pay and not for clawback firms with relatively low performance-based 
pay. 
Overall, the results in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that boards voluntarily adopt clawback 
provisions as part of a broader plan to enhance the reliability of accounting-based performance, 
tighten the sensitivity of CEO pay to accounting performance, and reduce risk-taking incentive 
(i.e., lower convexity in CEO compensation). The concurrent changes in other incentive schemes 
are thus unlikely to produce counter-factual effects invalidating our hypotheses. This implication 
differs from a criticism of Dodd-Frank Section 954 mandatory clawback provisions that they 
make incentive-based pay more risky and may induce firms to reduce the use of incentive-based 
compensation and the incentive-alignment benefits of such compensation (Denis 2012). 
4.3 Associations between clawback adoptions and next-period capital investments 
Table 5 presents the results of estimating Equation (4) relating capital investment in total 
and by type to clawback adoptions for the combined 4,200 firm-year study sample of clawback 
adopters and non-adopters. The results support our hypothesis H1 that clawback adoptions 
induce more capital expenditures and less R&D expenditures. For total capital investment, the 
coefficient on Clawback × Post is positive but insignificantly different from zero, indicating that 
clawback adoptions are not associated with a significant increase in total capital investment. 
However, the coefficient on Clawback × Post for R&D investment is significantly negative, 
consistent with Chan et al. (2015). If R&D investment decreases but total capital investment does 
not significantly change, it thus begs how capital investment mix shifted without compromising 
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the size of operation controlled by managers and firm growth profile that are linked to their 
compensation. As seen in the positive and statistically significant coefficient on Clawback × Post 
for Capex, a shift is made by clawback adopters away from R&D capital investment and toward 
Capex investment. The coefficient on Clawback × Post for acquisition capital investment is not 
significantly different from zero for the combined study sample. 
Table 6 presents estimates for Equation (4) relating capital investment in total and by type 
when applied to two sub-samples partitioned into relatively high and low performance-based 
pay. As in Table 5, statistically significant reductions in R&D and statistically significant 
increases in capital expenditures are again observed, but only for the high performance-based 
pay partition, after controlling for the confounding effects of concurrent changes in 
RiskTolerance.
23
 The result supports H2 that clawback adoption imposes greater incentives for 
managers to preserve performance-based compensation by shifting the capital investment mix. 
4.4   Clawback adoptions and capital investment efficiency 
        Table 7 presents estimates using Equation (6) to examine whether the shift in capital 
investment mix is related to the likelihood of inefficient capital investment. Panel A of Table 7 
reports the relation between clawback adoptions and the likelihood of overinvesting (i.e., top 
quartile of unexpected investment) versus benchmark (i.e., two middle quartiles of unexpected 
investment) for the test sample. The coefficient for Clawback × Post is significantly positive only 
for capital expenditures, indicating that clawback adopters are more likely to overinvest in 
property, plant, and equipment after clawback adoptions. 
Panel B of Table 7 shows the relation between clawback adoptions and the likelihood of 
overinvesting versus benchmark for two subsamples partitioned by the percentage of 
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 When the variable RiskTolerance is replaced with Vega and Delta or omitted, the shift in capital investment mix 
remains qualitatively identical. 
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performance-based pay in annual total pay. As in Table 6, we control for the confounding effects 
of concurrent changes in risk-tolerating incentives on the likelihood of overinvestment. For both 
total capital investment and capital expenditures, the coefficient on Clawback × Post is 
significantly positive for a subgroup of clawback adopters providing relatively high 
performance-based pay (HighPerfPay), indicating that the overinvestment in property, plant, and 
equipment is prominent for firms using high performance-based compensation.
24
 The increased 
total capital overinvestment for firms with high performance-based compensation also suggests 
that given high performance-based compensation, clawback adoptions induce executives to 
increase the size of operation as a “real” means to influence executive compensation. Combined, 
these results serve to confirm a positive association between clawback adoptions and capital 
overinvesting via a managerial incentive channel.
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4.5 Corroborating tests  
4.5.1 Effects of clawback adoptions on capital investment and firm liquidity 
As discussed in Section 2, capital investment mix shifts to acquisition expenditures can 
potentially generate immediate profits and executive compensation related to firm size, but also 
require enabling liquidity, with firms with less enabling liquidity less able to affect them. This 
reasoning suggests that capital investment mix shifts to acquisitions induced by clawback 
adoptions will be more prevalent for firms with ample liquidity. We test this reasoning by 
examining relations between clawback adoptions and capital investment by type conditional on a 
variable that measures acquisition-enabling liquidity. Acquisition-enabling liquidity reflects an 
equal weighting of cash and cash equivalents scaled by total assets, to reflect ability to effect 
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 These results are robust to the replacement of RiskTolerance with Vega and Delta and to the omission of 
RiskTolerance from the logistic regressions. 
25
 We correspondingly examine whether the reduction in R&D expenditures following clawback adoptions reported 
by Tables 5 and 6 is positively associated with the likelihood of underinvesting in R&D projects, but we did not find 
systematic evidence of this conjecture perhaps due to limited sample size (untabulated). 
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acquisitions in the short term, and (the negative of) financial leverage among all Compustat firms 
with available data in a given year, to reflect financing ability (following Biddle et al. 2009). We 
then classify as AmpleCash (Short-Cash) firms a group of firms with top 20% (bottom 80%) of 
this average rank during three years immediately before the adoption year, so as to better reflect 
ample and limited liquidity, termed AmpleCash and ShortCash, respectively. 
Results for Equation 4 estimated with conditioning for acquisition-enabling liquidity are 
reported in Table 8. The coefficients for both Clawback × Post × AmpleCash and Clawback × 
Post × ShortCash are insignificantly different from zero, indicating as above that clawback 
adoptions also have no significant effect on total capital investment for extreme high- and low-
liquidity firms. However, the coefficient for Clawback × Post × AmpleCash is positive and 
significant for Acquisitions and insignificantly different from zero for Capex and R&D. The 
coefficient for Clawback × Post × ShortCash is insignificantly different from zero for all three 
capital investment components. These findings are consistent with clawback adoptions inducing 
(not inducing) capital investment mix shifts toward acquisitions for firms with ample (limited) 
enabling liquidity, with little substitution away from capex and R&D expenditures as explained 
by having ample (limited) liquidity.26 
4.5.2 Effects of clawback adoptions on capital investment and growth opportunities  
In developing our hypotheses, we posit that managers respond to clawback adoptions by 
shifting capital investment mix in order to maintain the pretense of strong growth opportunities 
(Benmelech et al. 2010), a condition for which Skinner and Sloan (2002) show greater market 
responses to missing earnings targets. Chan et al. (2015) find that clawback firms are more likely 
to engage in real transactions manipulation when the market to book ratio, a proxy for market-
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 Ample liquidity firms can undertake acquisitions with less need to reduce R&D expenditures if acquisitions 
countervail the performance-linked compensation effects of clawback adoptions, whereas firms with limited 
liquidity are less enabled to undertake capital investment mix shifts. 
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perceived growth opportunities, is higher. We validate this premise by estimating Equation (4) 
relating capital investment in total and by type when applied to two sub-samples partitioned into 
firms with relatively high and low market-perceived growth opportunities following Chan et al. 
(2015).
27
 As in Table 5, Table 9 presents statistically significant reductions in R&D and 
statistically significant increases in capital expenditures, but only for the high growth partition. 
Thus, a capital investment mix shift from R&D to capital expenditures for clawback adopters is 
more prominent for clawback adopters with relatively high market-perceived growth potential, 
once again consistent with greater incentives to preserve performance-linked compensation. 
5. Conclusions 
This study examines whether capital investments are influenced by voluntary adoptions of 
clawback provisions that authorize boards of directors to recoup from company executives 
compensation based on restated financial results. We find that clawback adoptions induce capital 
investment mix shifts from R&D expenditures to capital expenditures, particularly for firms 
providing relatively high performance-based pay, consistent with pay-linked incentives. We also 
find that this shift in capital investment mix is related to overinvestment beyond an expected 
level supported by investment opportunities. Corroborative tests confirm that the shift from R&D 
to capital expenditure is more prominent for clawback firms with relatively high market-
perceived growth opportunities and that acquisition expenditures also increase for clawback 
firms with ample liquidity. 
These findings contribute to emerging evidence regarding the effects of clawback clauses 
that considers managerial responses to their adoptions. Extending prior evidence that clawback 
adoptions induce managers to cut R&D expenses to boost reported earnings, our findings reveal 
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 To elaborate, firms with average rank of market-to-book ratios during the three years prior to clawback adoption 
higher (lower) than the sample median are classified as firms with high (low) growth opportunities. 
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that R&D reductions documented in Chan et al. (2015) comprise part of a broader capital 
investment mix shift toward capital expenditures and acquisitions, conditional on enabling 
liquidity, and capital overinvestment that relate to managerial compensation incentives. As such, 
our results extend prior findings regarding perhaps unintended consequences of mandatory 
clawback adoptions that can inform their proposed condition for U.S. exchange listings that 
invites comments regarding possible effects. As such, this study extends the empirical literature 
on the relation between financial reporting quality and capital investment efficiency by adding 
evidence of the overinvestment in property, plant, and equipment driven by “real” earnings 
management to preserve performance-based compensation. This evidence is timely given 
pending SEC rule that would mandate clawback provisions for all firms listing on US exchanges 
and its call for “comment on any effect the proposed requirements may have on efficiency, 
competition and capital formation (SEC 2015, 103-104).” 
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Table 1 
Sample selection and composition 
 
Panel A. Clawback adopters by year 
 
Compensation clawback adopters by year (excluding financial firms). 
 
 
 
 
Panel B. Sample selection 
  
Number of 
observations 
Clawback adopters (excluding financial firms) between 2005 and 2012  1,032 
Matched with control firms using the propensity score matching  966 
With financial and corporate governance data available between 2002 and 
2012  9,500 
Omitting observations beyond T-3 to T+3  (5,300) 
Final firm-year sample (between 2002 and 2012) (Panel B of Table 2)  4,200
1)
 
Matched with Execucomp and missing values for control variables for 
expected compensation  (1,089) 
Final firm-year sample (between 2002 and 2012) (Panel A of Table 2)  3,111
2)
 
 
Note: 1) 4,200 observations for 892 firms (2,188 observations for 463 clawback adopters and 2,012 
observations for 429 non-adopters), 2) 3,111 observations for 669 firms (1,674 observations for 357 
clawback adopters and 1,437 observations for 312 non-adopters). 
 
  
Year Number of new adopters Total number of adopters 
2005   19    19 
2006   73    92 
2007 108   200 
2008 136   336 
2009 108   444 
2010 221   665 
2011 158    823 
2012 209 1,032 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics 
 
Descriptive statistics for regression variables for clawback adopters and control firms based on 
propensity-score matching.  All variables are defined in Appendix Table A1. 
 
Panel A. CEO Compensation regression variables (3,111 observations) 
 
Clawback adopters Non-adopters p-value for  
difference in 
 
Mean Stdev Median Mean Stddev Median Mean Median 
  
 
  
 
 
(t-test) (Wilcoxon) 
TotalPay 1.504 0.657 1.455 1.489 0.649 1.479 0.015 -0.024 
EquityGrant 1.015 0.716 0.964 1.002 0.717 0.956 0.013 0.008 
CashPay 0.626 0.340 0.534 0.636 0.354 0.560 -0.010 -0.026
***
 
ROA 0.058 0.085 0.060 0.061 0.093 0.059 -0.002 0.001 
RET 0.113 0.459 0.064 0.139 0.457 0.091 -0.026 -0.027
**
 
VOLROA 0.056 0.070 0.031 0.054 0.069 0.030 0.002 0.001 
VOLRET 0.115 0.051 0.104 0.116 0.051 0.105 -0.002 0.000 
MTB 2.109 1.231 1.728 2.190 1.304 1.774 -0.081
*
 -0.046 
LOGSALE 7.725 1.411 7.608 7.677 1.499 7.620 0.048 -0.012 
StockGrantRatio 24.37 23.87 21.39 23.04 24.20 18.35 1.33 3.04
*
 
OptionGrantRati
o 22.61 23.09 18.51 23.73 24.76 18.63 -1.12 -0.13 
SalaryRatio 24.07 17.32 18.71 24.85 19.65 18.74 -0.78 -0.03 
RiskTolerance
1)
 28.12 16.93 29.66 25.61 16.69 25.98 2.51*** 3.68*** 
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Panel B. Investment regression variables (4,200 observations) 
 
 
Clawback adopters Non-adopters p-value for  
difference in 
 
Mean Stdev Median Mean Stddev Median Mean Median 
  
 
  
 
 
(t-test) (Wilcoxon) 
Investment variables   
Investment 12.34 11.89 8.580 13.06 13.32 8.582 0.067
*
 0.500 
Acquisition 3.072 7.538 0.041 3.555 8.798 0.007 0.057
*
 0.877 
Capex 5.628 6.072 3.636 5.747 6.170 3.836 0.530 0.444 
R&D 3.543 5.767 0.208 3.371 5.757 0.000 0.335 0.082
*
 
AmpleCash 0.080 0.271 0.000 0.121 0.326 0.000 <.0001
***
 0.000*** 
ShortCash 0.099 0.299 0.000 0.106 0.308 0.000 0.444 0.443 
HighPerfPay
2)
 0.531 0.499 1.000 0.475 0.499 0.000 0.001
***
 0.001*** 
High Growth 0.538 0.499 1.000 0.521 0.500 1.000 0.269 0.269 
Institutions 0.691 0.305 0.787 0.686 0.301 0.777 0.620 0.216 
Analysts 12.01 9.381 10.00 11.24 8.868 9.000 0.006
***
 0.021** 
G-Score 6.213 4.956 8.000 5.550 4.962 7.000 <.0001
***
 0.000*** 
G-Dummy 0.343 0.475 0.000 0.400 0.490 0.000 0.000
***
 0.000*** 
AQ -0.049 0.041 -0.038 -0.050 0.040 -0.040 0.777 0.395 
SalesGrowth 9.132 22.42 7.539 11.624 25.86 8.414 0.001
***
 0.029** 
LogAsset 7.519 1.568 7.412 7.380 1.553 7.370 0.004
***
 0.037** 
Mkt-to-Book 1.830 1.074 1.492 1.924 1.215 1.516 0.008
***
 0.231 
Std-CFO 0.046 0.040 0.034 0.048 0.042 0.037 0.187 0.102 
Std-Sale 0.134 0.125 0.097 0.142 0.130 0.102 0.047
**
 0.055* 
Std-Inv 8.920 12.392 4.985 9.241 12.322 4.963 0.401 0.507 
Z-score -2.158 1.039 -2.225 -2.175 1.201 -2.200 0.634 0.463 
Tangibility 0.537 0.367 0.440 0.538 0.376 0.450 0.955 0.619 
K-Structure 0.184 0.190 0.135 0.198 0.207 0.138 0.028
**
 0.588 
Ind-K-Structure 0.172 0.120 0.140 0.185 0.131 0.151 0.001
***
 0.003*** 
Slack 0.160 0.170 0.099 0.166 0.185 0.093 0.284 0.416 
CFOsale 0.117 0.189 0.109 0.114 0.206 0.110 0.567 0.629 
Dividend 0.531 0.499 1.000 0.479 0.500 0.000 0.001
***
 0.001*** 
OperCycle 4.562 0.698 4.672 4.527 0.684 4.588 0.104 0.026
**
 
Losses 0.188 0.391 0.000 0.202 0.402 0.000 0.238 0.238 
Age 25.06 19.69 18.00 22.71 18.49 16.00 <.0001
***
 0.000*** 
 
Note:  1) 2,973 observations due to missing values for Vega and Delta,   2) 3,335 observations due to 
missing values for CEO annual salary and total pay data  
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Table 3 
Effects of clawback adoptions on managerial incentives  
 
Panel A. The sensitivity of CEO annual pay to accounting profitability 
 
 Dependent Variable (AnnualPay) 
 
TotalPay 
(1) 
EquityGrant  
(2) 
CashPay 
(3) 
Post 0.140 
 
 0.006 
 
 0.337 
*** 
 
 (0.92) 
 
 (0.03) 
 
 (4.32) 
 
 
Clawback*Post -0.100 
 
 0.174 
 
 -0.018 
 
 
 (-0.47) 
  
(0.62) 
  
(-0.16) 
  
ROA 0.608 
*** 
 0.458 
*  
0.202
 **  
 (3.16) 
 
 (1.80) 
  
(2.04) 
 
 
Clawback*ROA -0.290 
 
 -0.611 
* 
 -0.055 
 
 
 (-1.08) 
 
 (-1.72) 
  
(-0.40) 
  
Post*ROA  -0.287   -0.564 
*  0.071
   
 (-1.11) 
 
 (-1.64) 
  
(0.53) 
  
Clawback*Post*ROA  0.854 
**  
1.169 
**  
-0.182 
  
 (2.25) 
  
(2.33) 
  
(-0.94) 
  
Control variables  
  
 
  
 
  
RET 0.090 
*** 
 0.030 
  
0.026
   
 (2.72) 
  
(0.68) 
  
(1.50) 
  
VOLROA 0.595 
* 
 0.145 
 
 0.166 
 
 
 (1.71) 
  
(0.31) 
 
 (0.93) 
 
 
VOLRET 0.780 
 
 1.335 
** 
 -0.120 
 
 
 (1.60) 
 
 (2.06) 
  
(-0.48) 
 
 
MTB -0.054 
** 
 -0.024 
 
 -0.007 
 
 
 (-1.96) 
  
(-0.66) 
 
 (-0.52) 
 
 
LOGSALE 0.229 
*** 
 0.145 
** 
 0.132 
*** 
 
 (4.41) 
  
(2.11) 
 
 (4.95) 
  
Clawback*RET -0.021 
 
 0.014 
 
 0.005 
 
 
 (-0.49) 
 
 (0.25) 
 
 (0.23) 
 
 
Clawback*VOLROA -1.037 
** 
 -0.509 
 
 -0.166 
 
 
 (-2.21) 
  
(-0.82) 
 
 (-0.69) 
 
 
Clawback*VOLRET -0.975 
 
 -1.429
 *  
0.436
   
 (-1.60) 
  
(-1.78) 
  
(1.39) 
  
Clawback*MTB 0.132 
*** 
 0.166 
*** 
 -0.016 
 
 
 (3.77) 
  
(3.59) 
  
(-0.89) 
 
 
Clawback*LOGSALE -0.003 
 
 0.066 
 
 -0.062 
* 
 
 (-0.03) 
 
 (0.68) 
  
(-1.65) 
  
POST*RET -0.005 
 
 -0.004 
 
 -0.007 
 
 
 (-0.12) 
 
 (-0.08) 
 
 (-0.32) 
 
 
POST*VOLROA -0.831 
** 
 -0.551
   
-0.142
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 (-2.13) 
  
(-1.07) 
  
(-0.71) 
  
POST*VOLRET -0.472 
 
 -1.121 
* 
 0.324 
 
 
 (-0.92) 
 
 (-1.66) 
  
(1.23) 
 
 
POST*MTB 0.019 
 
 0.029 
 
 -0.013 
 
 
 (0.95) 
 
 (1.11) 
 
 (-1.32) 
 
 
POST*LOGSALE -0.010 
 
 0.016 
 
 -0.044 
*** 
 
 (-0.71) 
 
 (0.85) 
 
 (-5.92) 
  
Clawback*Post*RET 0.005 
 
 -0.068 
 
 -0.007 
 
 
 (0.08) 
 
 (-0.84) 
 
 (-0.21) 
 
 
Clawback* Post*VOLROA 0.510 
 
 0.039
   
0.243
   
 (1.00) 
 
 (0.06) 
  
(0.92) 
  
Clawback*Post*VOLRET 0.650 
  
1.232
   
-0.536
   
 (0.94) 
  
(1.35) 
  
(-1.51) 
  
Clawback*Post*MTB -0.062 
**  
-0.092
 **  
-0.004
   
 (-2.14) 
  
(-2.41) 
  
(-0.25) 
  
Clawback*Post*LOGSALE 0.009 
  
-0.027
   
0.007
   
 (0.46) 
  
(-1.02)
   
(0.72)
   
Firm-fixed effects  Yes  
 
Yes
   
Yes
   
Year-fixed effects Yes  
 
Yes
   
Yes
   
   
       
Overall R
2
 0.412  
 
0.132
   
0.175
   
N 3,111  
 
3,111
   
3,111
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Panel B. The composition of CEO annual total pay and the sensitivity of CEO equity portfolio 
value to stock price changes 
 
 Dependent variable 
 StockGrantRatio 
(1) 
 OptionGrantRatio  
(2) 
 SalaryRatio 
(3) 
 RiskTolerance 
(4) 
Post -1.612 
 
2.258  0.071 
 
0.465 
 (-1.09) 
 (1.62)  (0.06) 
 (0.54) 
Clawback*Post 1.845 
 -2.692
**
  0.615 
 -1.974
**
 
 (1.36) 
 
(-2.10)  (0.59) 
 
(-2.46) 
Control variables  
 
   
 
 
ROA 0.938 
 
-19.22
***
  -15.782
***
 
 
-13.726
***
 
 (0.16) 
 
(-3.57)  (-3.62) 
 
(-4.09) 
RET -1.571
*
 
 
  -0.092    -3.734
***
 
 
  -6.137
***
 
 (-1.71) 
 
(-1.06)  (-5.32) 
 
(-11.45) 
VOLROA -25.83
**
 
 
8.587  1.003 
 
2.285 
 (-2.27) 
 
(0.80)  (0.12) 
 
(0.34) 
VOLRET -45.59
***
 
 
54.816
***
  -7.792 
 
-7.058 
 (-2.84) 
 
(3.62)  (-0.64) 
 
(-0.75) 
MTB -1.132 
 
5.222
***
  -0.413 
 
-2.316
***
 
 (-1.26) 
 
(6.19)  (-0.60) 
 
(-4.40) 
LOGSALE -0.688 
 
0.696  -4.325
***
 
 
0.175 
 (-0.36) 
 
(0.38)  (-2.94) 
 
(0.15) 
  
 
   
 
 
Firm-fixed effects  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes 
 
Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes  Yes 
 
Yes 
  
 
   
 
 
Overall R
2
 0.054 
 
0.085  0.140 
 
0.064 
N 3,111 
 
3,111  3,111 
 
2,973 
 
Note: See Appendix Table A1 for variable definitions. Panels A and B show results of running OLS 
regression for Equations 2 and 3 with firm- and year-fixed effects, respectively. T-statistics are reported 
in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level in a two-tailed test, 
respectively. Overall R
2
 means a weighted average of the between R-squared and the within R-squared. 
Column (4) of Panel B uses 2,973 observations due to missing values for Vega and Delta.
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Table 4 
Effects of clawback adoptions on managerial incentives for subsamples for high versus low performance-based pay partitions 
 
Panel A. The sensitivity of CEO annual pay to accounting profitability  
 
 Dependent variable  
 TotalPay EquityGrant CashPay  
 HighPerfPay  
(1) 
LowPerfPay 
(2) 
HighPerfPay  
(3) 
LowPerfPay 
(4) 
HighPerfPay  
(5) 
LowPerfPay 
(6) 
  
Post 0.407
***
 -0.008
 
-0.502 -0.232 0.408
***
 0.129
 
  
 (2.79) (-0.04)
 
(-1.54) (-0.86) (2.79) (1.64)
 
  
Clawback*Post 0.093 -0.243
 
-0.336 -0.034 -0.097 -0.173
 
  
 (0.29) (-0.68)
 
(-0.65) (-0.08) (-0.49) (-1.32)
 
  
ROA 0.530
*
 0.697
***
 0.345 0.569
*
 0.118 0.306
***
   
 (1.93) (2.61) (0.90) (1.68) (0.69) (3.12)   
Clawback*ROA -0.091 -0.565 -0.336 -1.001
**
 0.200 -0.389
***
   
 (-0.24) (-1.46) (-0.65) (-2.03) (0.86) (-2.72)   
Post*ROA  -0.201 -0.396 -0.287 -0.840
*
 0.050 0.032   
 (-0.55) (-1.09) (-0.56) (-1.82) (0.22) (0.24)   
Clawback*Post*ROA  1.495
***
 0.107 1.524
**
 0.775 -0.158 -0.044   
 (2.89) (0.19) (2.11) (1.11) (-0.49) (-0.22)   
  
 
   
 
  
Control variables Included Included
 
Included Included Included Included
 
  
  
 
   
 
  
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes
 
  
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes
 
  
  
 
   
 
  
Overall R
2
 0.179 0.018
 
0.099 0.005 0.143 0.313
 
  
N 1,595 1,516
 
1,595 1,516 1,595 1,516
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Panel B. The composition of CEO annual total pay and the sensitivity of CEO equity portfolio value to stock price changes  
 
 Dependent variable  
 StockgrantRatio OptiongrantRatio SalaryRatio RiskTolerance 
 HighPerfPay  
(1) 
LowPerfPay 
(2) 
HighPerfPay  
(3) 
LowPerfPay 
(4) 
HighPerfPay  
(5) 
LowPerfPay 
(6) 
HighPerfPay  
(7) 
LowPerfPay 
(8) 
Post -3.918
*
 0.617
 
1.310 2.757 2.358
***
 -1.651
 
0.732 0.047 
 (-1.93) (0.29)
 
(0.71) (1.33) (2.87) (-0.79)
 
(0.61) (0.04) 
Clawback*Post 0.345 1.388
 
-2.860
*
 -1.564 -0.541 1.044
 
-2.977
***
 -0.765 
 (0.37) (0.69)
 
(-1.69) (-0.80) (-0.72) (0.53)
 
(-2.71) (-0.65) 
  
 
   
 
  
Control variables Included Included
 
Included Included Included Included
 
Included Included 
  
 
   
 
  
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes
 
Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes
 
Yes Yes 
  
 
   
 
  
Overall R
2
 0.071 0.044
 
0.148 0.022 0.112 0.062
 
0.042 0.082 
N 1,595 1,516
 
1,595 1,516 1,595 1,516
 
1,549 1,424 
 
Note: See Appendix Table A1 for variable definitions. Panels A and B show results of running OLS regression Equations 2 and 3 with firm- 
and year-fixed effects. Coefficients on control variables not reported for brevity. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level in a two-tailed test, respectively. Overall R2 means a weighted average of the between 
R-squared and the within R-squared. 
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Table 5 
Effects of clawback adoptions on next-period capital investment by type 
 
 Dependent variable 
 Investment 
(1) 
 
Acquisition 
(2) 
 Capex 
(3) 
 R&D 
(4) 
Post -0.668 
 
0.088  -0.559
***
 
 
0.101 
 (-1.00) 
 (0.16)  (-2.70) 
 (0.96) 
Clawback*Post 0.163 
 
-0.287    0.390
**
  -0.176
*
 
 (0.26) 
 
(-0.56)  (2.02) 
 
(-1.79) 
Control variables  
 
   
 
 
Institutions -1.247 
 
-1.380  0.646 
 
0.072 
 (-0.96) 
 
(-1.29)  (1.61) 
 
(0.35) 
Analysts 0.161
***
 
 
  0.127
***
  0.025 
 
-0.011 
 (2.74) 
 
(2.63)  (1.37) 
 
(-1.22) 
G-Score -0.105 
 
0.054  -0.262 
 
0.114 
 (-0.20) 
 
(0.12)  (-1.59) 
 
(1.36) 
G-Dummy  -1.124 
 
-0.049  -1.270 
 
0.690 
 (-0.23) 
 
(-0.01)  (-0.83) 
 
(0.89) 
AccrualQuality 2.239 
 
3.923  2.492 
 
-0.465 
 (0.32) 
 
(0.68)  (1.15) 
 
(-0.42) 
SalesGrowth -0.003 
 
-0.009  0.005
*
 
 
0.001 
 (-0.41) 
 
(-1.37)  (1.89) 
 
(0.79) 
LogAsset -7.487
***
 
 
-2.681
***
  -1.444
***
 
 
-1.714
***
 
 (-8.64) 
 
(-3.77)  (-5.39) 
 
(-12.56) 
Mkt-to-Book 1.566
***
 
 
0.044  0.841
***
 
 
0.258
***
 
 (5.00) 
 
(0.17)  (8.68) 
 
(5.24) 
StdCFO -7.263 
 
-4.055  -1.862 
 
2.821
**
 
 (-0.95) 
 
(-0.65)  (-0.79) 
 
(2.34) 
StdSale 1.011 
 
1.601  0.780 
 
-1.243
***
 
 (0.41) 
 
(0.79)  (1.03) 
 
(-3.21) 
StdInvestment -0.150
***
 
 
-0.094
*** 
 -0.035
***
 
 
-0.001 
 (-6.56) 
 
(-5.01)  (-4.91) 
 
(-0.29) 
Z-Score -1.487
***
 
 
-1.724
*** 
 -0.170 
 
-0.172
***
 
 (-3.63) 
 
(-5.12)  (-1.34) 
 
(-2.67) 
 
Tangibility 6.958
***
 
 
8.333
*** 
 -0.677 
 
1.239
***
 
 (2.86) 
 
(4.18)  (-0.90) 
 
(3.24) 
K-structure -18.788
***
 
 
-10.544
*** 
 -5.737
***
 
 
-0.526 
 (-8.08) 
 
(-5.52)  (-7.98) 
 
(-1.44) 
Ind-K-Structure -6.057
*
 
 
-1.717  -2.594 
 
-0.300 
 (-1.73) 
 
(-0.60)  (-2.39) 
 
(-0.54) 
Slack 17.464
***
 
 
17.464
***
  0.015
***
 
 
-0.044 
 (6.68) 
 
(8.27)  (0.02) 
 
(-0.11) 
CFOsale -2.272 
 
0.388  1.125
**
 
 
-0.894
***
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 (-1.57) 
 
(0.33)  (2.51) 
 
(-3.91) 
Dividend -0.524 
 
0.049  -0.329 
 
-0.218 
 (-0.59) 
 
(0.07)  (-1.20) 
 
(-1.52) 
OperatingCycle 0.437 
 
0.379  0.204 
 
0.638
***
 
 (0.61) 
 
(0.64)  (0.92) 
 
(5.65) 
Losses -0.531 
 
-0.564  0.138 
 
0.252
***
 
 (-0.92) 
 
(-1.19)  (0.77) 
 
(2.77) 
Age 0.009 
 
-0.050  0.028 
 
0.018 
 (-0.92) 
 
(-0.12)  (0.18) 
 
(0.23) 
  
 
   
 
 
Firm-fixed effects  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes 
 
Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes  Yes 
 
Yes 
  
 
   
 
 
Overall R
2
 0.112 
 
0.007  0.000 
 
0.090 
N 4,200 
 
4,200  4,200 
 
4,200 
 
Note: See Appendix Table A1 for variable definitions. Estimated using OLS regression for Equation 4 
with firm- and year-fixed effects. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level in a two-tailed test, respectively. Overall R2 means a weighted 
average of the between R-squared and the within R-squared.  
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Table 6 
Effects of clawback adoptions on next-period capital investment by type for high versus low performance-based pay partitions  
 
 Dependent variable  
 Investment Acquisition Capex R&D 
 HighPerfPay  
(1) 
LowPerfPay 
(2) 
HighPerfPay  
(3) 
LowPerfPay 
(4) 
HighPerfPay  
(5) 
LowPerfPay 
(6) 
HighPerfPay  
(7) 
LowPerfPay 
(8) 
Post -0.602 -0.627
 
0.011 -0.243 -0.820 0.029
 
0.174 -0.162 
 (-0.58) (-0.56)
 
(0.01) (-0.25) (-3.04) (0.09)
 
(1.05) (-1.04) 
Clawback*Post 0.071 -0.582
 
-0.502 -0.489   0.982
***
   -0.315
 
  -0.276
*
 0.102 
 (0.07) (-0.54)
 
(-0.62) (-0.53) (3.93) (-1.02)
 
(-1.80) (0.68) 
RiskTolerance 0.009 -0.555
*
 -0.015 -0.031   0.012
*
   -0.024
*
   0.002 0.004 
 (0.34) (-1.94) (-0.68) (-1.27) (1.73) (-2.95) (0.48) (1.10) 
Other control 
variables 
Included Included
 
Included Included Included Included
 
Included Included 
  
 
   
 
  
Firm fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes
 
Yes Yes 
Year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes
 
Yes Yes 
  
 
   
 
  
Overall R
2
 0.062 0.001
 
0.012 0.001 0.020 0.007
 
0.026 0.022 
N 1,581 1,474
 
1,581 1,474 1,581 1,474
 
1,581 1,474 
 
Note: See Appendix Table A1 for variable definitions. Estimated using OLS regression for Equation 4 with firm- and year-fixed effects. 
Coefficients on control variables not reported for brevity. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level in a two-tailed test, respectively. Overall R2 means a weighted average of the between R-squared and the within R-
squared. 
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Table 7 
Effect of clawback adoptions on deviations from expected capital investments by type  
 
Panel A. Total sample  
 
 Dependent variable = Overinvesting (versus Benchmark) 
 Investment  
 (1) 
Acquisition  
(2) 
Capex 
(3) 
R&D 
(4) 
Clawback -0.205
*
 -0.066 -0.122 -0.003 
 (-1.86) (-0.64) (-1.08) (-0.02) 
Post -0.369
***
 -0.099 -0.263
*
 -0.130 
 (-2.71) (-0.83) (-1.91) (-0.76) 
Clawback*Post 0.254 0.086 0.336
*
 0.243 
 (1.44) (0.56) (1.88) (1.13) 
     
Control variables Included Included Included Included 
     
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Pseudo-R
2
 0.126 0.093 0.221 0.270 
N 3,233 3,371 3,336 2,728 
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Panel B. High versus low performance-based pay partitions 
 
 Dependent variable = Overinvesting (versus Benchmark) 
 Investment Acquisition Capex R&D 
 HighPerfPay  
(1) 
LowPerfPay 
(2) 
HighPerfPay  
(3) 
LowPerfPay 
(4) 
HighPerfPay  
(5) 
LowPerfPay 
(6) 
HighPerfPay  
(7) 
LowPerfPay 
(8) 
Clawback -0.414
**
 0.015 -0.031 -0.125   -0.199   -0.196   0.084 0.216 
 (-2.03) (0.08) (-0.18) (-0.68) (-0.93) (-0.92) (0.31) (0.78) 
Post -0.686
**
 -0.197
 
-0.630
***
 0.168 -0.174 -0.307
 
0.188 -0.218 
 (-2.66) (-0.84)
 
(-2.97) (0.82) (-0.69) (-1.27)
 
(0.57) (-0.65) 
Clawback*Post 0.676
**
 0.030
 
0.351 -0.102   0.553
*
   0.092
 
  0.008 0.250 
 (2.12) (0.10)
 
(1.34) (-0.37) (1.79) (0.28)
 
(0.02) (0.58) 
RiskTolerance 0.005 -0.008
 
-0.001 -0.013
***
   0.005   0.003
 
  0.022
***
 0.026
***
 
 (0.85) (-1.50) (-0.30) (-2.80) (0.94) (0.47) (3.20) (3.48) 
Other control 
variables 
Included Included
 
Included Included Included Included
 
Included Included 
  
 
   
 
  
Industry fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes
 
Yes Yes 
Year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes
 
Yes Yes 
  
 
   
 
  
Pseudo-R
2
 0.161 0.129
 
0.124 0.119 0.251 0.306
 
0.278 0.312 
N 1,151 1,116
 
1,269 1,193 1,190 1,212
 
905 740 
 
Note: Variables are defined in Appendix Table A1. Estimated using logistic regression for Equation 5 with year- and industry-fixed effects. Industry 
classification is based on two-digit SIC codes. Z-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels in a two-tailed test, respectively. Overall R2 means a weighted average of the between R-squared and the within R-squared. 
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Table 8 
Effects of clawback adoptions on next-period capital investment by type and firm liquidity 
 
 Dependent variable 
 Investment 
(1) 
 
Acquisition 
(2) 
 Capex 
(3) 
 R&D 
(4) 
Post -0.934 
 
-0.158  -1.122
**
 
 
0.089 
 (-1.27) 
 (-0.39)  (-2.42) 
 
(0.58) 
Clawback*Post 0.189 
 
-0.521  1.028
**
 
 
-0.222 
 (0.26) 
 
(-1.33)  (2.27) 
 
(-1.48) 
Conditioning variables  
 
   
 
 
Post*AmpleCash 3.015
**
 
 
1.039  -0.071 
 
-0.012 
 (2.07) 
 
(1.31)  (-0.08) 
 
(-0.04) 
Clawback*Post*AmpleCash 1.161 
 
2.440
**
  -1.436 
 
0.163 
 (0.53) 
 
(2.02)  (-1.03) 
 
(0.35) 
Post*ShortCash -0.127 
 
-0.157  1.006 
 
-0.083 
 (-0.08) 
 
(-0.18)  (1.01) 
 
(-0.25) 
Clawback* Post*ShortCash -1.299 
 
-0.562  -0.485 
 
-0.216 
 (-0.61) 
 
(-0.48)  (-0.36) 
 
(-0.48) 
  
 
   
 
 
Control variables Included 
 
Included  Included 
 
Included 
   
 
   
 
Firm fixed effects Yes  Yes
 
 Yes  Yes
 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes
 
 Yes  Yes
 
   
 
   
 
Overall R
2
 0.081  0.011
 
 0.166  0.109
 
N 4,200  4,200
 
 4,200  4,200
 
 
Note: See Appendix Table A1 for variable definitions. Estimated using OLS regression for Equation 5 with 
interactions with the indicator variables for ample and short liquidity and with firm- and year-fixed effects. 
Coefficients on control variables not reported for brevity. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level in a two-tailed test, respectively. Overall R2 
means a weighted average of the between R-squared and the within R-squared. 
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Table 9 
Effects of clawback adoptions on next-period capital investment by type for market-perceived growth opportunities 
 
 
 Dependent variable  
 Investment Acquisition Capex R&D 
 High Growth 
(1) 
Low Growth 
(2) 
High Growth 
(3) 
Low Growth 
(4) 
High Growth 
(5) 
Low Growth 
(6) 
High Growth 
(7) 
Low Growth 
(8) 
Post -0.685 -0.941
 
-0.171 0.399 -0.489
*
 -0.602
* 
0.116 0.010 
 (-0.73) (-0.99)
 
(-0.22) (0.51) (-1.89) (-1.78)
 
(0.72) (0.09) 
Clawback*Post -0.105 0.615
 
  -0.111   -0.433   0.474
**
   0.253
 
  -0.432
***
 0.160 
 (-0.12) (0.68)
 
(-0.16) (-0.59) (1.98) (0.79)
 
(-2.91) (1.41) 
  
 
   
 
  
Control variables Included Included
 
Included Included Included Included
 
Included Included 
  
 
   
 
  
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes
 
Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes
 
Yes Yes 
  
 
   
 
  
Overall R
2
 0.045 0.077
 
0.001 0.019 0.000 0.003
 
0.052 0.230 
N 2,284 1,913
 
2,284 1,913 2,284 1,913
 
2,284 1,913 
 
Note: See Appendix Table A1 for variable definitions. Estimated using OLS regression for Equation 5 with firm- and year-fixed effects. 
Coefficients on control variables not reported for brevity. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level in a two-tailed test, respectively. Overall R2 means a weighted average of the between R-squared and the within R-squared. 
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Table A1 
Variable definitions  
 
Clawback 1 if a firm is in the treatment group (clawback adopters) and 0 if a firm is instead 
in the control group (non-adopters) 
Post 1 for all firm-years (including clawback and control firms) if clawback 
provisions are in place in a year, and 0 otherwise 
Clawback* Post 1 for all firm-years for clawback firms if clawback provisions are in place in a 
year, and 0 otherwise 
Compensation regressions 
TotalPay The natural logarithm of one plus inflation-adjusted CEO annual total pay 
(ExecuComp tdc1) for year t. Inflation adjustment is based on Consumer Price 
Index.  
EquityGrant The natural logarithm of one plus inflation-adjusted CEO annual equity grants 
(i.e., option grants + stock grants) for year t. Inflation adjustment is based on 
CPI.  
CashPay The natural logarithm of one plus inflation-adjusted CEO annual cash pay 
(ExecuComp totalcurr) for year t. Inflation adjustment is based on CPI.  
ROA Accounting return on assets for year t (net income before extraordinary items 
and discontinued operations deflated by lagged total assets)  
RET One-year stock returns during year t  
VOLROA The standard deviation of return on assets over the prior five years  
VOLRET The standard deviation of stock returns over the prior five years  
MTB The firm’s investment opportunity set with the firm’s year-end market-to-book 
ratio averaged over the previous five years 
LogSale The natural logarithm of sales revenue during year t+1 
StockGrantRatio CEO annual stock grants times 100 divided by CEO annual total pay for year t 
OptionGrantRatio CEO annual option grants times 100 divided by CEO annual total pay for year t 
SalaryRatio CEO annual salary times 100 divided by CEO annual total pay for year t 
RiskTolerance
1)
 Vega times 100 divided by the sum of Delta and Vega for year t 
Delta The sensitivity of CEO stock and option portfolio value to stock returns 
Vega The sensitivity of CEO stock and option portfolio value to stock return volatility  
Investment regressions 
Investment One-year-ahead net investment (capital expenditure – cash receipts from sale of 
property, plant, and equipment + acquisitions + research and development 
expenditure) multiplied by 100 and deflated by current-year total assets. 
Acquisition One-year-ahead acquisitions (i.e., COMPUSTAT ACQ*-1) multiplied by 100 
and deflated by current-year total assets  
Capex One-year-ahead capital expenditure (i.e., COMPUSTAT CAPX) multiplied by 
100 and deflated by current-year total assets  
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R&D One-year-ahead research and development expenditure (i.e., the higher of R&D 
expenditure and zero) multiplied by 100 and deflated by current-year total assets 
Overinvesting 
(Underinivesting) 
An indicator variable for overinvesting (underinvesting). We estimate 
unexpected investment as the residual of the full-sample regression of one-year-
ahead total investment deflated by current total assets on current-year sales 
growth rate and Tobin’s Q (i.e., the ratio of the market value of total assets to the 
book value of total assets) with industry- and year- fixed effects controlled. The 
industry-fixed effect is based on Fama and French’s (1997) 48 industry 
classification.  Overinvesting is equal to 1 for a group of firm-year observations 
in the top 25 percentile of the level of unexplained investment and 0 for a group 
of firm-year observations between the top and bottom 25 percentiles. 
Underinvesting is equal to 1 for a group of firm-year observations in the bottom 
25 percentile of the level of unexplained investment and 0 for a group of firm-
year observations between the top and bottom 25 percentiles. Overinvesting and 
Underinvesting are also measured for acquisition, capital expenditures, and R&D 
expenditures, respectively. 
 
HighPerfPay 
(LowPerfPay) 
An indicator variable for firms with relatively high (low) ratio of performance-
based pay to total pay. We measure the average ratio of CEO annual non-salary  to 
CEO annual total pay (i.e., (tdc1 – salary)/tdc1) during three years immediately 
after the adoption year. We then classify a firm as a HighPerfPay (LowPerfPay) 
firm if its average ratio is higher (lower) than the sample median ratio. 
AmpleCash   
 
An indicator for ample cash available for investment. We measure the average of 
the rank of cash and cash equivalents deflated by total assets and the rank of -1 × 
leverage among all Compustat firms with available data in a given year (following 
Biddle et al. 2009). We then classify as AmpleCash (Normal- or Short-Cash) firms 
a group of firms with top 20% (bottom 80%) of this average rank during three 
years immediately before the adoption year. 
ShortCash An indicator for short cash available for investment. We classify as ShortCash 
(Normal- or Ample-Cash) a group of firms with bottom 25% (higher 75%) of this 
average rank during three years immediately before the adoption year. 
HighGrowth 
 
An indicator variable for firms with relatively higher (lower) growth potential. We 
measure the average market-to-book ratio by each firm for the pre-adoption period 
(T-3 to T-1). We then classify as HighGrowth (LowGrowth) firms whose average 
market-to-book ratios are higher (lower) than the total sample median.  
Institutions The percentage of firm shares held by institutional investors 
Analysts The number of analysts following the firm as provided by I/B/E/S 
G-Score The measure of anti-takeover projection created by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2003), multiplied by minus one 
G-Dummy An indicator variable for firm-year observations with missing values of G-Score 
AccrualQuality The standard deviation of the firm-level residuals of working capital accruals from 
the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model during the years t-5 to t-1 and multiplied by 
minus one 
SalesGrowth The percentage change in sales from year t–1 to t 
LogAsset The log of total assets 
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Mkt-to-Book The ratio of the market value of total assets to the book value of total assets 
StdCFO Standard deviation of cash flows from operating activities by average total assets 
from years t-5 to t-1 
StdSale Standard deviation of sales deflated by average total assets from years t-5 to t-1 
StdInvestment Standard deviation of capital investment from years t-5 to t-1 
Z-Score A proxy for bankruptcy risk based on the Altman (1968) Z-Score formula 
Tangibility The ratio of property, plant, and equipment to total assets 
K-structure Capital structure measured as the book value of long-term debt/(the book value of 
long-term debt + the market value of equity) 
Ind-K-Structure Industry capital structure measured as the average of K-structure for all Compustat 
firms in the same SIC 3-digit industry given a year 
Slack The ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets  
CFOsale The ratio of CFO to sales 
Dividend An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm paid a common or 
preferred dividend, and 0 otherwise 
OperatingCycle The log of receivables to sales plus inventory to cost of goods sold times 360 
Losses An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if net income before extraordinary 
items is negative, and 0 otherwise. 
Age The number of years that have been passed since the firm appears in CRSP 
 
